About 800 of them fought a two-day pitched battle with the Iraqi Army, which was forced to retreat and call in US airpower. The group was heavily armed and used anti-aircraft missiles to bring down one American helicopter. The battle finally ceased after around 200 insurgents were killed, including the cults leader, reportedly armed with a hat and coat and two pistols. Perhaps Nietzsche was right when he observed, "in individuals, insanity is rare; but in groups, parties, nations and epochs, it is the rule."

Mission "Possible": Audacity and Precision Bordering on the Fictitious

The weekend before Al-Najaf, around 30, almost certainly Sunni insurgents, disguised themselves and a number of SUVs to look like US military brass, and, then, nonchalantly drove through 3 check points into the secure compound of the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Centre, where the US military had convened a meeting to discuss security for the upcoming Ashura pilgrimage. Having entered the compound, the insurgents coolly picked out only American troops, killing five of them and leaving all Iraqi soldiers unharmed. They then left and passed back through the same checkpoints unheeded.

The operation had all the audacity and planning of a Western special forces undertaking, with almost Hollywood scale drama. But what exactly was the purpose of this expensive, high risk adventure? Propaganda value? Yes, but perhaps more ominously, by kidnapping and shooting only Americans, it was a form of psychological warfare, almost as if they were making a statement, or delivering a menace telling the enemy that "we're coming to get you . . . and you have nowhere to hide!" Moreover, "from now on you will be treated just like sectarian victims. Expect to be tortured and executed!"

Of course, the Americans are incredulous and immediately blamed the Iraqis, pointing to collaboration and raising again the question of being able to trust them in any operations. There certainly is some explaining to do and some almost unbelievable security blunders. Undoubtedly, insider information was involved, but one can't get away from the sophistication and daring of a methodically and meticulously prepared operation, carried out so easily against such a superior foe. Strategists can only be shocked, because it also says that if the Iraqi Army can't implement one single high level security operation, and protect top brass and VIPs, what hope has it of battening down Baghdad, a city of six million people?!

The Battle for Haifa Street – A New Tenacity and Professionalism

This month's battle for Haifa Street was the first inkling of a new Sunni strategy in the face of the anticipated U.S. offensive. From the 4th to the 12th of January, for up to 12 hours a day for almost a week around 1,000 US and Iraqi troops were fought to standstill by 100 or so Sunni insurgents in a fire fight of a character and intensity not normally witnessed before.

Unlike most previous insurgent attacks, that were characterized by hit and run tactics, opportunistic sniper fire or roadside bombs, this was a sophisticated, well-commanded and coordinated assault by up to a dozen different Sunni insurgent groups, collaborating together. It was evidently a well-planned and implemented operation with the express intention of engaging large scale U.S. and Iraqi forces in persistent, relentless and tenacious, close-quarter, urban combat.

Militarily, the battle at Haifa Street was important from a number of standpoints. Firstly, the combined efforts of US and Iraqi forces were unable to defeat the insurgents. The 500 U.S. troops engaged there could neither contain nor crush what were probably at most 100 insurgents. Moreover, the weakness of the Iraqi forces and the big doubt over whether they could hold onto areas after the U.S. withdrawl was exposed. There were some 400 Iraqi Army personnel involved who, if they had faced the attack on their own, would have been routed. The 500 U.S. troops were fought to a standstill, even though they enjoyed the advantage of air support in the form of repeated assaults by Apache attack helicopters and even F-15 jet fighters, which proved worthless in dislodging the determined insurgents.

A key factor in the Sunni success was their high mobility and command and coordination. They changed positions swiftly and often in small numbers of only two or three men, melting away and then remerging in different positions. Indeed, during the battle, U.S. troops were not just fighting across one side of the street to the other, but they were taking fire from all different directions at once, and were frequently forced to run for their lives, abandoning building after building.

What made Haifa different was from a military standpoint that was the insurgents were more than able to fight the American over a long period in a more classical-style war conflict situation. The Sunni were commanded and co-ordinated in highly professional way and acted with discipline and a high degree of flexibility. They furthermore applied novel tactics that were used to great effect and which the U.S. troops were unable to respond to. At times the guerrillas ran rings around helpless U.S. units and looked near to inflicting a defeat on them, despite having a manpower deficit of some four or five to one in the U.S. favour and one to ten if one bothers to count the Iraqi Army.

The poor U.S. performance must increase reservations about their ability to clear Baghdad of militias and insurgents. At the same time, in the week long battle, Iraqi forces showed more evidence of their inability and unreadiness to take on insurgents, casting further doubt on their potential for success in both the first wave and then in the critical second phase of coming operations, when they are expected to of hold onto areas liberated by U.S. troops. While the U.S. and Iraqi forces appeared uncoordinated and lacking in trust, the new phenomenon for the insurgents was the collaboration in combat of around 12 different insurgent troops, prepared to subjugate themselves to a common command. Finally, there appeared to be a definite deficit in levels of morale between the two battling sides – the insurgents coming out on top, while the U.S., and, especially the Iraqis not showing the same level of tenacity and audacity shown by their opponents.