The first and fundamental democratic right to fall with the invasion of Iraq was the right of a nation to self-determination. It was this right that underpinned the legitimacy and success of the American War of Independence, and is now trampled underfoot in its Imperialist dealings with all countries in the Middle East. It lies at the root of the impasse in the current crisis in Palestine, where both the US and Israel refuse to recognize the democratically elected Hamas government and is undermining the social stability of Lebanon, where they are , likewise, trying to subvert the legitimate social and electoral support for Hezbollah. Indeed, its contempt for the right of nations to self-determination pervades America’s attitude to all the countries of the Middle East and is one key source of the hatred felt towards it by the Arab peoples. 

Whatever our personal opinion of what is the best or most suitable form of government, it is for the Iraqi peoples to work out and decide for themselves rather than our aspirations for them. It is their future.

The Humpty-Dumpty Empire.       

 Trying to hold together the disintegrating and blood-soaked pieces of former British colonies is a thankless task.. Even where people provide “solutions” to avoid their disintegration out of honest and well-meaning motivations, the internal and external forces of self-interested Imperial and sectarian participants too often shipwreck their plans.

The social calamities experienced by synthetic, British ex-colonies like Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Israel, Palestine, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland is a short list of Britain’s “Hall of Shame,” which should speak for itself. It is a picture of millions of lives lost in civil war, insurgency, sectarianism and terrorism. All of this has resulted from the divide and rule, sectarian tactics of British Imperialism, when creating and governing these pseudo-nations for their own strategic and economic interests. Iraq is now one such country in question.

Iraq has existed for less than a hundred years. It was artificially carved from the old Ottoman Empire. The name and the state of “Iraq” didn’t exist until it was under British mandate in 1920, when it was established without any concern for natural ethnic or religious boundaries. It border were just part of what Churchill contemptuously called “drawing lines in the sand.”  The very name Iraq is neither native nor Arabic, but a derivation from the Persian word “Erak”, meaning, “lower Iran.” 

As they did in Ireland, India and Malaysia (to name a few) the Brits ruled Iraq by leaning on one ethnic minority against the rest, in this case the Sunnis against the Kurds and Shias. Sunni tribal leaders made up the colonial administration and a Sunni Hashimite family from Mecca took the throne. Nominal independence was gained in 1932. In its short history, it has faced 11 uprisings and 4 major wars, all related to the same issues bursting to the surface today. It was inevitable that the country would simply implode as a result of US invasion occupation.

In truth Iraq is another “misfit” of Imperialism designed to secure foreign oil interests and play out balance of power politics. The same two concerns govern the invasion of Iraq today and its intended affect on process in the Middle East as a whole.          

Trying to stabilize and keep these man-made monsters together has been one of the principle tasks and failures of British and US imperialism since the countries gained independence. Consequently, in searching for a solution one has to determine if the monster can be stitched back together. If so, are the internal and external situations favourable to this being sustained and can they also provide a suitable quality of life for the people.

Therefore, before, we suggest any solutions to the Iraq dilemma, the first question to be posed is; should we try and keep this artifice together, and, secondly, should we work with important internal and foreign participants who are making efforts to achieve exactly this, but in their own, cynical self-interests.

Whatever solution is put forward, or becomes popular, one has to ask if it is only again temporarily plastering over fissures that will soon blow open again, given the current state of the nation and the influences of the regional and international environment? Will today’s sticking plaster only temporarily subdue the subterranean build up of contradictions and unresolved problems, which will only haemorrhage out even more violently, in the not so distant future.  

Despite the artificiality of Iraq, most people sense that the break up of a larger political, social and economic unit into smaller parts is a regressive step. Thus, the most popular solutions are generally seen to be those that appear to find a compromise or bridge between the contradictory centrifugal and centripetal forces at work.

Discussions range from the need for a strong unitary state governed again by a dictator, to break-up into independent states. In the middle, and increasingly the dominant trend, is the notion of some form of federalization. This has been part of the constitutional preamble since early on, when ex-patriot parties and leaders returned to Iraq in 2003 and enshrined in the March 2004 Transitional Administrative Law, even preceding the current federalist constitution of November 2006.

Sectarian Federalism

Today’s federalism in Iraq is a sectarian, Shiite “solution.” It originated among formerly, exiled Shiite politicians and clerics and has never been an “Iraqi solution,” i.e. a demand arising from among all sections of the peoples and corresponding to their common needs and aspirations. It has been supported by the Kurds, to favour the maintenance of their own autonomy, but its has been consistently rejected by the Sunnis, who see it as heavily favouring the political and economic interests of the Shiites. It has not even been a popular demand stemming from the body of the Shiite population.

Despite federalism being the platform of the larger government parties, there is considerable scepticism towards it among ordinary Shiites. They see first hand how parties are using it for Machiavellian purposes. Its most forthright proponent is the influential cleric and leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. His position is the most radical, calling for the merger of all the Southern governates into one Shiite “super-region.” In general terms, the federalist « solution » provides for three autonomous regions in all their affairs of government with the exception of the national army and police and national defence. He is supported tentatively by Prime Minister Maliki, whose Dawa Party depends on him as the largest block in parliament.

Yet ironically, Maliki also depends on the Sadrist block of Muqtada al-Sadr, which until now has opposed federalism! Both the Sadrists and the Fadhila Party, which rules Basra, oppose federalism, more because they fear they would loose their power over local governates in the south, which, in a super-region would become politically dominated by al-Hakim’s SCIRI. Muqtada al-Sadr goes so far as to call for unity between Sunnis and Shiites, while his Mehdi Army is responsible for the majority of sectarian murders and attacks on them. When it comes to political programs both al-Sadr and the Fadhila party could also easily switch positions on federalism, if it suited them. Such is the integrity of these individuals on any issues.

Who governs in the south doesn’t depend on the results of the local elections, but whoever has the most powerful militia in town. Al-Hakim’s Badr Brigades have power in some towns, but not the majority. The super-region “solution” basically suits the power lust of al-Hakim, who so far has found no other way to get full control over the south.

Federalism originated from above, not from below. It is a fabrication of opportunist, sectarian politicians, who have just about managed to scrape it into the constitution against the opposition of Sunni representatives, as well as some important Shiite parties. Indeed, the balance between the pro-federalist and anti-federalist Shiite blocks is very close. After all, their physical majority already ensures they have control over the oil in the south, even with the existing constitution.

Federalism has managed to get so far because of the failure of democracy and the lack of a clear, public end game on the part of the U.S. The other factor is the lack of alternatives. There is either the option of going back to dictatorship or a full-ahead course to independence. However desperate their situation, these are two roads which people still hesitate to take. Federalism in Iraq is not so much the exercise of self-determination, as the product of indetermination.

It would be wrong to give the impression that there is no grass root support at all for federalism. There is certainly an important section of the Shiite population in favour of federalism as a way to guarantee their stranglehold over some of the country’s main economic resources. Hakim did secure the highest votes for a single party in the elections. But going by voting patterns is not a clear indicator of intent. Al-Hakim wins considerable votes just due to his important religious authority. Furthermore, in the referendum, the high turnout by Shiites was secured in no small part because the country’s supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, issued a Fatwah ordering people to vote

Would Federalization Work?

Even if federalism isn’t a mass grassroots movement today, it could become one, and remains the main political kid on the block. Arguing for a return to dictatorship or the prospect for all-out war that independence would bring is difficult. At the same time, the status quo is equally difficult to defend. Something has to be put forward and federalism is the most suitable to the machinations of the opportunistic politicians.

The simple argument of al-Hakim in favor of federalism is to point to the success of Kurdish autonomy. It is demagogy because he well knows that the situation in “Kurdistan” is quite different from other parts of the country. The Kurdish autonomous regional government has been successful for five key reasons, which differentiate it from the rest of the country (until now.) These are:

1) The greater ethnic and religious homogeneity of the region;
2) the independent economic potential of the oil revenues;
3) the lack of factionalism deriving from the long, historical, social solidarity formed in the struggle for independence;
4) greater socio-economic stability and unity; and finally,
5) these factors have allowed the region to have a more stable state apparatus with a popular government and security forces.

Some of the factors, especially one and twp have also been partially present in the oil rich Shiite south, which until now has experienced relatively less violence than Baghdad or the Sunni regions. Yet in the South, political in-fighting and the consequent disruption of the economy have now reached dangerous levels. Al-Hakim can make the simple point that if the current democratic structures are done away with (since they don’t function any way,) then a new super, single governate of all provinces could bring peace and prosperity. This allows him to play on the legitimate frustration and disgust with both the local political militia factionalism and the central government. Put at its bluntest “you have everything the north has economically and more, all you need is the same autonomy and peace and prosperity is yours.”

This is simply a lie. The problem is not whether the Shias have a “super region” or not. The Kurdish area is not a “super region” on this model. It is run on the basis of the same governate, decentralized democracy that the Shiites have in place. It is not one great centralized region where the governates have been abolished. They co-exist with a regional authority, army and police. The key difference is that there isn’t the same level of political factionalism and militia rivalry that bedevils the south, and which is precisely the product of the machinations of politicians like al-Hakim. Shiite “federalism” is simply a dangerous attempt by opportunistic Shiite politicians to divert attention from their own failings and growing unpopularity, and to make up for this by demagogically winning an advantage over their rivals.