In the absence of other alternatives the argument could catch on. But its potential appeal is limited to the Shiite south, because Baghdad and the mixed Shia/Sunni areas benefit from none of the advantages enjoyed by the Kurdish region, and, moreover, suffer from much of the militia misrule and factionalism found in the south. Their economies are in ruins. Indeed, the whole fabric of their society is in tatters. 

The purely Sunni areas are. They have little or no independent economic resources and lack any perspectives for the future. Furthermore, they are practically lawless. The old state machinery collapsed and has been replaced by the rule of the different insurgents and tribal chiefs. Unity between some insurgent groups is only preserved by the need for extra combined forces against the common occupying U.S. enemy. Rivalry is still fierce and ideological divisions stretch from Baathists and nationalists across the spectrum of groups to Al Qaeda. People mostly hanker for the days of the old regime and hope for a share in a unitary Iraq for economic reasons. But, at the same time, they live in distrust and dread of Shia domination and potential victimization and revenge for the past crimes of the old pro-Sunni regimes.

The workability of any proposal has to have the support or potential support of all sectors of the population. The only area where it is supported generally is the Kurdish area. There is still growing suspicion among Kurds over the question of a Shia “super region,” which would increase overall Shiite power in Iraq and perhaps cause problems on wealth sharing and other questions at a national level. They would probably prefer to keep to a much weaker form of federalism for the Shia and Sunni regions. Yet, at the same time the status quo is beginning to eat away at the fringes of the Kurdish region and the disputed mixed belt around its border. Mosul faces escalating violence and Kirkuk is on the verge of civil war. It is increasingly obvious that “Kurdistan” cannot remain hermetically sealed from events infecting the rest of the country. 

But despite Kurdish support, if the concept of federalism fails to win support among the Sunnis, then it is unworkable as a national strategy. And why should the Sunnis support the creation of Shia “super region”? Clearly, their present fears of discrimination and punishment for the past will be even more poignant. Any lingering hope or confidence in the national government would evaporate. At the very least, if a movement for separation did develop, then they would demand their own “super region.” This would mean a battle for every inch of disputed, mixed territory stretching from the Syrian border to Iran and right up north into the borderlands of the Kurdish region. 

The Sectarian Role of the United States.

Bereft of new ideas for a new epoch, the U.S. is falling back on the old methods of British Imperialism in divide and rule and the sectarian tactics to deal with counter-insurgence. In particular, they are surreptitiously turning to a method which was successfully employed in  Malaysia.

There the British forsook support among the population, as a whole, for leaning on the support of one ethnic group against another, in order to defeat the insurgents. The U.S. and U.K. are now doing the same with the Shias in Iraq. Behind the crackdown on Shia militias lies a deal struck with Maliki and al-Hakim (and, indeed even with Muqtada al-Sadr) to crush all Shia militia opposition to them, in return for their unequivocal support for the surge. After it is all over, Maliki and Hakim will be handed the Iraqi Army and police as part of their private army. As we go to press, British forces, together with army units sympathetic to Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and his Badr Brigades have attacked the incumbent Fadhila party, in an effort to hand Hakim the prize of Iraq’s second city of Basra. Under the cloak of crushing “criminal elements,” all “unreliable” Shia militias are being first moped up, before a real offensive is begun against the Sunni insurgents.

The reason is the US cannot lean upon the Shia majority, if it is not first stable and reliable. Once they have secured a loyal Shia “maharajah,” they don’t have to keep looking over their shoulders, while attacking Sunni insurgents. The American will then crush the Sunnis for the Shias. They will break the back of Sunni morale, crushing all who cannot be bought off and leaving Maliki and al-Hakim free to introduce their form of “federalism.”

Similar style efforts are being tried with regard to Sunni collaborators. The American Ambassador and aids are busy at work discussing with tribal and insurgent Sunnis to strike a similar deal, which will then free the U.S. to focus on Al Qaeda. But this is less likely to work, as they are weaker than Hakim and the U.S. has little plausible to promise them in return 

So while the Iraqi government throws dust in the eyes of the world, talking of criminals and terrorists, the idea goes that the rank and file militants will be moped up and sectarian killings and insurgency will be brought down to minimum, “acceptable “ levels. The U.S. will be able to withdraw with a face-saving solution and will be long gone by the time Iraq reaps the whirlwind, when sectarianism and insurgency recovers enough to plunge Iraq into a new all-out civil war. Or so the plan goes. 

Federation or Confederation?

However, by allowing the Shias to continue to pursue a federalist policy, and concentrating on the Shiite sectarians, the U.S. runs the risk of the Sunni insurgency spiraling out of control. While it concentrates first on closing down Baghdad, the U.S. forces are extremely overstretched in the rest of the country. There are already strong indications, that the surge is failing and a process of “Baghdadisation” is now spreading nationwide.

By adopting even a disguised sectarian support for a federalist government, the U.S. is sending a message to the insurgency and even to the Shiite militias, that there is simply nothing to loose. On both extremist sides a policy of total independence will be counterpoised to federalism. Indeed, in some ways it is more appealing and could begin to get popular support.

Complete separation and the creation of independent, homogenous Sunni, Shia and Kurdish states could appear to offer a permanent solution to sectarianism. Formal “police-able” borders could be established to substantially reduce sectarian deaths. Shiites would be rid of the age-old ghost of Sunni domination and Sunnis would be free of the menace of revenge. Since Sunnis would have nothing to loose and more to gain from leaving a federal Iraq, being independent would at least bring “negative” benefits. In many ways both sides would gain. Ironically, the biggest losers could be the Kurds who would be unlikely to hang on to their independence, as Turkey would probably invade, in order to quash the separatist appeal among its own Kurds. However, what might head-off such an outside intervention could be the creation of a new dual state of the federal union of Kurdish and Shia Iraq.

Furthermore, independence would only work if neighboring powers were prepared to intervene economically and not militarily. This would be especially the case for an independent Sunni state. Saudi Arabia would need to intervene economically in much the same way West Germany did, in order to reunify and stabilize East Germany - except in the case of Sunni Iraq, without there being a political union. Of course, much would depend on the strength of Al Qaeda, for this to be viable.

Perhaps the best solution for Iraq would be not a federation, but a “Confederation of Independent States,” in which the independent states negotiate a treaty on economic, political or military matters of mutual interest.  It could possibly draw upon the common historical links and the common trade routes, by naming itself the “Mesopotamian Confederation”, the “Fertile Crescent Confederation” or the “Rafidan Confederation” according to the Arabic translation of Mesopotamia, that refers to the country of the Tigris and Euphrates.

The great problem is that getting to independence is the same as the potential consequences of federalization – it means wading waist high through blood and corpses. There would be genocidal ethnic cleansing as a mad grab for land, cities and towns took place. Worst of all would be the question of Baghdad, which would become another Sarajevo or 70’s-style Beirut.

A Confederation of Independent States, on the other hand, could have Baghdad as its confederate capital, while each independent state would choose a new capital. The route to independence would have to be phased transition, with a U.N. negotiated settlement of boundaries and international aid for resettlement and development.

Indeed, just as much as negative developments influence the whole Middle East, the concept of confederation is something which could put something positive into the region as a whole with its great wealth and potential. A sort of Common Market, Free Trade Zone or the Middle East Union, similar to European Union, could act as an economic boost and also a strategic buffer against U.S. intervention and exploitation, as well as helping to undercut the dangerous growth of competing local imperialist powers.    

The Right to Self Determination

At the end of the day such “castles in the sky”, as we propose, depend on what the Iraqi peoples themselves want and how they get their voices heard. Whether Shia, Sunni or Kurd they are all united around three basic needs and aspirations – security, revenue and freedom. An end to violence, the possibility of economic growth and freedom from the threat of persecution and discrimination. In the end they will choose to go with the system which appears to offer the likeliest possibility of achieving this. They may even have to test some out before moving to a more permanent solution. But under such exceptional circumstances, the route to self-determination must surely itself have to take on asymmetrical forms.

At the moment, the only place that self-determination can be realized is on the streets. People will vote with their feet and with their guns at a certain stage. This is the only way their voices will be heard and potentially the only way that new leaders can be thrown up from among the honest ranks of the Iraqi masses, of whatever creed. At a certain moment, the current paralysis of the masses in the face of the violence will break down, and demonstrations and movements will arise of an intifada-like quality. The masses will lose their fear and decide to take matters into their own hands. This is the beginning of real self-determination and it needs no electoral frills or party buntings.

In the end, it is the will of the people which makes any system viable and workable. Our castles in the sky may not go much further than the pages they are written on. But in our own countries, we must educate and agitate on the basic right of all nations and peoples to self-determination and we must use it as a stick to beat our own governments. And, while we do so, the answer to that question of where now for Iraq, should not be too long in coming from amongst the Iraqi peoples themselves.

Stephen J. Morgan 20/02/2007