But that, too, holds no guarantee of success. Why? Because, in the long term, even the desert recovers. People come back, grass grows, buildings re-arise and weeds flourish with a double vengeance. And, unless the entire socio-political situation is changed, the Americans have to start all over again with a new counter-insurgency. Again the discussion becomes ludicrous. However ruthless the Americans are, the terrorists would pursue their same favourite policy. Faced with a 'scorched earth' policy they would just move to another country, until the conditions were right to return. Jihad would be exported and then re-imported. Similar types of approach have totally failed for the Russians in Chechnya or the Soviets and the U.S. in Afghanistan.
Indeed the most experienced forces with regard to counter-terrorism and urban counter-insurgency are the Israelis. Yet, one only has to look at their record and the intensity of their efforts to see how everything has been in vain. The Occupied Territories of West Bank and Gaza, seized in 1967, have a combined population of 4 million, The insurgency began proper with the second intifada beginning in 2000. It has been entirely urban combat. In the course of it, the Israeli forces have killed some 4,000 Palestinians and wounded more than 20,000. Another 28,000 insurgents have been arrested and 8,000 Palestinians remain in prison. The scale of the loss of innocent lives, destruction of homes and infrastructure is well-known. But despite the
colossal repression, the insurgency shows no sign of stopping 6 years on. Were the Americans to employ the same intensity of counter insurgency in Iraq, it would mean having to arrest about 190,000 insurgents and to kill or wound another 140,000.
Furthermore, the U.S. forces have lost at an incredible rate of some 3,000 dead and 20,000 wounded in 3 years, compared to an average of 500 Israelis in the same period. Even if one takes into account differences in size of population, Americans are still dying at insurgent hands at something like 6 times the rate of Israeli troops under fire. Should the current Iraqi insurgency become a full-blown uprising, as in the Occupied Territories, it would be much more ferocious and deadly. Nearly all the population has weapons. Consequently, it would quickly become an armed uprising
involving thousands, if not millions. Numbers of U.S. casualties would be exploded geometrically. Hundreds of thousands of troops could loose their lives. Moreover, in comparison with the Israelis they are doing a much worse at the job already, let alone faced with its escalation.
If the example of Palestine were not enough for the Americans, then the ignominious and humiliating defeat for Israel in Lebanon should serve as a fresh reminder of what can happen when the an inferior military force like Hezbollah has the balance of moral and psychological forces weighted decisively in its favour.
Perhaps the psychological factor that could tip the balance towards the Americans, would be at least ‘being wanted’. And they most certainly are not. Regardless of White House propaganda, this is not true in Iraq. Despite some reluctant support in some sections of the population, and despite some measure of hostility or antipathy toward the insurgents, the majority of people oppose the U.S. presence nd have little confidence in either the Iraqi national government, Army or police. At the same time, there is sufficient, substantial support and toleration of the militias and insurgents by the population for them to thwart the U.S. and finally succeed. The difference between Iraq and the few successful counter-insurgency wars there have been - such as Malaysia and Indonesia - is largely due to the fact that despite much opposition, the national government and army, plus the foreign troops, had, at least, some important basis of support within the population, especially in urban areas. And then they supported one ethnic group against another.
Consequently, there isn't sufficient positive support for the U.S. to win and there is enough for the insurgents to be able to function very effectively. This is the key reason why they are able to return to areas that have been cleared or withdrawn from. Moreover, when the U.S. troops get as far as clearing an area and handing it over to the Iraqi Army, they can't hold it for the same reason - they lack sufficient public support. Moreover, if the U.S. defeat the insurgents with all its military might, then the poorly trained and equipped Iraqi troops stand no chance. The attitude towards them will be exactly the same as it is to the Americans – “for God’s sake get out, you’re making matters worse!” And there is real truth in that.
The reason for the military failure in Iraq exists on many levels, and not just
militarily. Strategic and tactical matters are inextricably interlinked with moral and psychological issues. Many other factors, such as the mode of thinking in the White House and the Pentagon, the opinion changes among the people of Iraq and in the U.S. and world opinion, in general, all play an important role. The fact that the situation changed so dramatically within three years belies how complex the interaction of these factors are. Complexity is not something which conservative thought deals with easily both for the military and political leadership of a country. And if that is not enough,
the next thing which conservative thought finds bewildering and abhors is chaos – precisely the two phenomena governing the essence of the Iraqi situation and a crucial reason why the current U.S. conservative leadership is simply incapable of dealing with
it.
Stephen Morgan 15/01/07
